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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2) (f) , Utah Code 
Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE 1: WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL 
TO SUPPORT THE DEFENDANT JAMIE DANIEL 
HUNSAKER'S A CONVICTION OF ONE COUNT OF 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL? 
When reviewing the findings of a trial judge sitting without 
a jury, this appellate court will overturn a guilty verdict only if 
it is clearly erroneous. State v. Taylor, 818 P. 2d 1030 (Utah 
1991) . Also, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that "When 
challenging the findings of fact of the trial court on appeal, the 
appellant must show that the findings of fact were clearly 
erroneous. In order to show clear error, the appellant must 
marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings of fact, and then demonstrate that the evidence, including 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to 
support the findings against an attack." State v. Moosman, 794 
P.2d 474 (Utah 1990). 
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ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE ARRESTING OFFICER HAD 
REASONABLE SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
ON THE PART OF HUNSAKER AND THE 
INDIVIDUALS ACCOMPANYING HIM, THEREBY 
ALLOWING THE OFFICER TO DETAIN HUNSAKER 
FOR INVESTIGATIVE PURPOSES? 
A trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion is a 
determination of law and is reviewed nondeferentially for 
correctness. However, the reasonable suspicion standard is one 
that conveys a measure of discretion to the trial judge when 
applying that standard to a given set of facts. State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
ISSUE 3: DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN REFUSING TO APPROVE A PROPOSED PLEA 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES? 
Rule 11(h)(2), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that 
proposed plea agreements are subject to the approval of the trial 
court. The trial courts decision to approve or reject a plea 
agreement should be reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard. 
2 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah R. Crim P. Rule 11 See Addendum, Page 1 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 See Addendum, Page 2 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a prosecution and conviction for the 
violation of Section 41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated, Driving Under 
the Influence of Alcohol, in the Third Circuit Court, West Valley 
Department, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Prosecution in this case was commenced with the arrest of 
Jamie Daniel Hunsaker on December 4, 1994. The pretrial conference 
was held on January 27,1995, and a bench trial before the Honorable 
Edward A. Watson, was conducted on June 7, 1995. 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
At trial, Hunsaker was convicted of the class B misdemeanor 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. On July 26, 1995, Hunsaker 
was sentenced to serve 90 days in jail (80 days were suspended) and 
was charged fines and assessments totaling $1,387.50. Hunsaker was 
also placed on probation for 12 months with a provision that an 
additional five days of jail would be suspended upon successful 
completion of probation. A Notice of Appeal in this case was filed 
on July 26, 1995. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On December 4, 1994, at approximately 1:20 am, West 
Valley Police Officer Pearce was patrolling the parking lot of the 
Westerner Bar in West Valley City. This was a regular part of 
Pearce's patrol and upon entering the parking lot he made contact 
with a security person from the bar. (Tr. 10-11, 17-18). 
2. Approximately 15 minutes after arriving at the Westerner 
parking lot, the security person with whom Pearce had previously 
spoken approached him. The security person pointed out a group of 
individuals crossing the parking lot and informed Pearce that they 
were intoxicated and had been fighting or trying to pick fights in 
the bar. (Tr. 12-14). Pearce observed the individuals enter a 
vehicle, with Hunsaker at the wheel, and begin to back up. Pearce 
activated his grill lights and pulled in behind the vehicle to 
block its path. (Tr. 14). 
3 . West Valley Officer Newbold arrived on the scene and made 
contact with Hunsaker. Newbold observed Hunsaker as swaying or 
unstable on his feet and detected the odor of alcohol on his 
breath. (Tr. 27-29) . 
4. Newbold informed Hunsaker that he suspected Hunsaker of 
driving while intoxicated and asked Hunsaker to perform field 
sobriety tests. (Tr. 29-30). 
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5. Newbold administered a gaze nystagmus test and a one leg 
stand and count. Newbold found all indicators of the gaze 
nystagmus test indicated that Hunsaker had consumed alcohol. Also, 
Hunsaker was unable to complete the one leg stand test. (Tr. BO-
SS) . 
6. Hunsaker stopped the one leg stand test in the middle of 
the test and stated to Newbold that "I can't do it, I've had too 
much, just arrest me." (Tr. 38). 
7. Newbold administered a Intoxilyzer chemical test to 
Hunsaker. The results of that test were excluded by the trial 
court. (Tr. 39-67). 
8. Hunsaker testified at trial that he had not been in an 
altercation in the bar and that he had only two beers during the 
evening. (Tr. 92-94). Hunsaker also testified that he had been 
instructed to perform the one leg stand test with his arms straight 
out. (Tr. 102-117-118). 
9 . April Hunsaker testified that upon picking Hunsaker up at 
the police station following his arrest, he told her that there had 
been an altercation in the bar. (Tr. 132-133). 
10. Newbold testified that he always instructed persons 
performing a one leg stand test to put their arms at their side, 
and that Hunsaker performed the test in that manner. (Tr. 13 5-137) . 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL 
COURT WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A 
GUILTY VERDICT ON THE CHARGE OF 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL. 
The witnesses at trial provided the trial court with 
sufficient evidence to prove each element of the crime of driving 
under the influence of alcohol. The trial court relied on this 
evidence and upon the lack of credibility it found in the testimony 
of the defendant in reaching its verdict. These facts and 
inferences were articulated by the trial court in the findings of 
fact it made concurrent with its verdict. Hunsaker failed to 
marshal these facts in arguing insufficiency of the evidence. 
POINT II: WEST VALLEY CITY POLICE OFFICERS HAD 
REASONABLE SUSPICION TO DETAIN AND 
QUESTION HUNSAKER PRIOR TO HIS 
ARREST. 
The trial court, based on the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the vehicle stop and detention of Hunsaker, found that 
Officer Pearce had reasonable suspicion to suspect that Hunsaker 
may be involved in criminal activity. The reasonable suspicion was 
raised by communication to Officer Pearce directly from a security 
person at the Westerner bar that the defendant may have been 
involved in an altercation inside the bar. The Court found that 
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the security person was well known to Officer Pearce, that Officer 
Pearce knew the security person to be in radio contact with other 
security personnel inside the bar and that the suspects were 
directly pointed out to Officer Pearce by the security personnel. 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO SETTLE THIS 
CASE BY APPROVING A PLEA BARGAIN 
AGREEMENT. 
Whether or not to accept or reject a proposed plea agreement 
is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Hunsaker has 
presented this court with no basis for determining that the trial 
court in this case abused its discretion in refusing to approve a 
proposed plea agreement. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL 
COURT WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A 
GUILTY VERDICT ON THE CHARGE OF 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL. 
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal 
case is governed by a clear and unambiguous standard. The Utah 
Supreme Court has articulated that standard as follows: 
When reviewing the findings of a trial judge 
sitting without a jury, this court will 
overturn a guilty verdict only if it is 
clearly erroneous. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 
8 
191, 192-93 (Utah 1987) . The basis of this 
standard is rule 52 (a) , Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, "Findings by the court": 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury. . . the court shall find the facts 
specially and state separately its conclusions 
of law thereon... Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 
due regard shall be given to the opportunity 
of the trial court to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses. 
State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1991) (Footnote omitted). 
The Supreme Court has defined the "clearly erroneous" standard 
as follows: 
A finding is "clearly erroneous" when although 
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing 
court on the entire evidence is left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been committed. 
Further clarification is offered by Wright & Miller: 
The appellate court... does not consider and 
weigh the evidence de novo. The mere fact 
that on the same evidence the appellate court 
might have reached a different result does not 
justify it in setting the findings aside. It 
may regard a finding as clearly erroneous only 
if the finding is without adequate evidentiary 
support or induced by an erroneous view of the 
law. 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). 
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Finally, the Utah Court of Appeals followed the guidance of 
the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Germonto, 886 P. 2d 50 (Utah 
1983), by stating: 
In considering the challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we review the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
verdict... If, during the review, we find some 
evidence or inferences upon which findings of 
all the requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made, we affirm. 
State v. Perry, 871 P.2d 576 (Utah App. 1994). 
An examination of the record of this case demonstrates that 
the evidence presented to the trial court was more than sufficient 
to sustain a conviction. Also, the Appellant's brief fails to 
adequately marshal the evidence against him, specifically including 
the evidence cited by the court in making its ruling. Marshaling 
the evidence supporting the conviction is a requirement of Utah 
law. State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990). That evidence 
which supports the conviction and was relied upon by the trial 
court can be fairly summarized as follows: 
1. The defendant was in physical control of and operating a 
motor vehicle. (Tr. 14-16) 
2. That Hunsaker had the odor of alcohol on his breath. 
(Tr. 29). 
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That Hunsaker was observed by Officer Newbold as swaying, 
being unstable, and having difficulty in standing. (Tr. 
29) . 
That upon administration of a horizontal gaze nystagmus 
test by Officer Newbold, Hunsaker performed in all 
aspects of the test as would be expected from a person 
who had been consuming alcohol. (Tr. 30-35). 
Hunsaker was also unable to satisfactorily complete the 
one leg stance field sobriety test administered by 
Officer Newbold. The court specifically found that 
Hunsaker was only able to count to five and then put his 
foot down. He then raised his foot again and counted 
from six to 13 before again putting his foot down. 
Finally, he raised his foot, counted 14 and 15 and then 
discontinued the test. (Tr. 35-18). 
Upon lowering his foot and discontinuing the one leg 
stance field sobriety test, the court found that Hunsaker 
told the officer, "I can't do it, I've had too much, just 
arrest me." (Tr. 38) . 
The court also found that Mr. Hunsaker's testimony lacked 
credibility. (Tr. 150-152). Specifically, Hunsaker's 
extensive testimony that no disturbance or altercation 
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had occurred in the bar was specifically contradicted by 
the testimony of his wife, April Hunsaker. She testified 
that he told her of the disturbances when she picked him 
up at the police station following his arrest. (Tr.92-
94, 132-133). Also, Hunsaker changed his testimony 
regarding the clothing he was wearing that night, and his 
description of the position of his arms during the one 
leg stance field sobriety test was contradicted by the 
testimony of Officer Newbold. (Tr. 100-101, 115-117, 
130-131, 102-103, 117-118, 136-137). 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court was 
presented with sufficient evidence or inferences upon which 
findings of all the elements of the crime of driving under the 
influence can be made. The trial court made an excellent record of 
its findings of fact in announcing its verdict. (Tr. 147-152). 
The only evidence presented which contradicted the evidence of 
guilt was the testimony of Hunsaker, which the trial court clearly 
regarded as having little credibility. 
The verdict of the trial court in this case is clearly 
supported by sufficient evidence in the record and should be 
affirmed. 
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POINT II: WEST VALLEY CITY POLICE OFFICERS HAD 
REASONABLE SUSPICION TO DETAIN AND 
QUESTION HUNSAKER PRIOR TO HIS 
ARREST. 
West Valley City agrees with Hunsaker that the stopping of a 
motor vehicle and detention of its occupants constitutes a seizure 
within the meaning of Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States. State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994). The 
City also agrees that a limited crime investigation stop is 
justified if there is a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
As the court stated in Case: 
While the required level of suspicion is lower 
than the standard required for probable cause 
to arrest, the same totality of facts and 
circumstances approach is used to determine if 
there are sufficient "specific and articulable 
facts" to support reasonable suspicion. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. See 
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8, 109 
S. Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989). 
Accord State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah 
App. 1994); Strickling, 844 P.2d at 983. 
Case, at p. 1276. 
The Court of Appeals has stated that in determining the 
existence of reasonable suspicion, a court must look to the 
totality of the circumstances. The conduct observed must suggest 
to an officer, in light of that officer's experience, that criminal 
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activity may be afoot. State v. Nguyen, 878 P.2d 1183 (Utah App. 
1994). In this case, the trial court found the following facts: 
1. Officer Pearce was patrolling the Westerner Bar parking 
lot as part of his normal and regular duties. The court 
found that this was something the officer frequently does 
and xvhe goes as part of his duty to the Westerner parking 
lot to check up on and with security officers of the 
Westerner to see if things are in control, if any illegal 
activity or problems criminally are going on." (Tr. p. 
87) . 
2. The court found that Officer Pearce had established a 
relationship with the security officers at the Westerner. 
(Tr. 87) . 
3. The court found that the security officers for the 
Westerner are there to maintain peace and order and have 
a regular interchange with West Valley City police 
officers. (Tr. 87). 
4. The court found that in this particular situation Officer 
Pearce had made contact with a specific security officer 
15 minutes prior to being advised of the situation 
involving Hunsaker. The court specifically found that 
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Officer Pearce was already on the scene and knew the 
security officer personally. (Tr. 88) . 
5. The trial court found that 15 minutes after Officer 
Pearce's first contact with the security officer, he was 
advised by the security officer that there were persons 
in the Westerner parking lot who were intoxicated and had 
attempted to cause fighting inside the Westerner bar. 
(Tr. 88). 
Based on the totality of these facts, the trial court 
determined that Officer Pearce was privy to articulable facts that 
would give an officer a reasonable suspicion that there was 
criminal activity afoot. Based on those facts, the court 
determined that Officer Pearce's detention of the Hunsaker vehicle 
was lawful and appropriate. (Tr. 89-90). 
Hunsaker has mistakenly relied on a line of cases specifically 
dealing with vehicle stops made in response to police dispatch 
bulletins or fliers. That is clearly not the situation in this 
case. 
Officer Pearce did not receive any information regarding this 
situation through police dispatch or a police flyer. Officer Pearce 
received his information, regarding possible criminal activity by 
Hunsaker, directly from a citizen, albeit a citizen acting as a 
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security person or "bouncer" for the Westerner bar. Officer Pearce 
was familiar with the individual providing the information and was 
aware that the security person was in radio contact with other bar 
employees inside the Westerner. (Tr. 19-20) This is simply not 
analogous to a "dispatch stop'7 case as those cited by Hunsaker, 
such as State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994) . In State v. 
Case, the court raised several questions regarding facts that are 
often missing in dispatch cases. The court stated: 
However, the findings wholly fail to establish 
the department's reasonable, articulable 
suspicion to issue the "possible car prowl" 
bulletin to officers on duty. We are left to 
speculate as to how the dispatch instructions 
came to be made: Was a call received from a 
citizen? If so, what did the citizen say? 
Did the dispatcher interpret the report? If 
so, in what manner? Did a supervising officer 
direct that the investigation be made based on 
a pattern of similar activity in the area? If 
so, what were the sources of the supervisor's 
information? Merely providing descriptive 
information to an officer about whom to stop, 
by itself, is not enough to justify the stop 
if there are no articulable facts point to 
which establish why a stop was to be made. 
Case at p.1278 (Footnote omitted)(Emphasis in original). 
In this case, no such questions existed. Officer Pearce was 
on the scene prior to the time the incident occurred. Also, 
Officer Pearce was and had been in direct contact with the person 
from whom he received information. He worked with this person on 
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a frequent basis and knew him to be in direct radio contact with 
other personnel inside the Westerner bar. Furthermore, the person 
relaying the information to Officer Pearce provided Pearce with a 
description of the suspected criminal activity and directly pointed 
out the individuals suspected to be involved. (The altercation in 
the bar was later confirmed by the testimony of April Hunsaker. 
Tr. 132-133). Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the 
totality of the facts incident to the stop and detention of 
Hunsaker provided Officer Pearce with a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity. The trial court's analysis of those facts was 
correct and should be affirmed. 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO SETTLE 
THIS CASE BY APPROVING A PLEA 
BARGAIN AGREEMENT. 
The City agrees with Hunsaker's description of Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and the relevant case law when 
Hunsaker states "it appears to be well established as a matter of 
law that a trial judge is generally under no duty to accept a 
negotiated settlement of a case, nor is he bound by any agreement 
between the parties, and that the acceptance of a plea of guilty to 
a lesser offense included in the offense charge is generally a 
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matter addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 16-17). 
In this case, Hunsaker has provided no citation to the record 
indicating he objected to the trial courts refusal of the plea 
agreement, nor is the City able to locate such an objection in the 
record. This being an issue raised for the first time on appeal, 
it is therefore not appropriate for the Appellate Court to consider 
this argument. State v. Jaeger, 265 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah App. 
1995). 
Hunsaker makes essentially two arguments as a basis for his 
contention that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing 
to approve the plea agreement. Neither argument is persuasive. 
First, Hunsaker argues that a plea agreement should have been 
approved because of the weakness of the prosecution's case. 
Apparently, however, the prosecution's case was not as weak as 
Hunsaker would have this court believe since he was, in fact, 
convicted. Had the case been a truly weak case, it would not have 
been supported by the evidence at trial and Mr. Hunsaker would have 
been found not guilty. This argument is further undermined by 
Hunsaker's apparently willingness to accept a plea agreement 
requiring him to plead guilty to an alcohol related reckless 
driving charge. Apparently, the prosecution's case was strong 
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enough that Hunsaker was willing to plead guilty to a reduced 
charge rather than proceed to trial in hopes that the City could 
not prove its case. 
Hunsaker's second abuse of discretion argument concerns the 
trial court's ability to disapprove plea agreements unlawfully 
impinges upon the discretion of the prosecutor. This is not an 
abuse of discretion argument at all, but is rather a direct attack 
on the court's ability to approve and disapprove a plea agreement 
as set forth in Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the 
cases cited approvingly by Hunsaker. The process for the approval 
of a plea agreement by the trial court is clearly set forth in Rule 
11 and the trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to approve the plea agreement. 
The reason stated by the trial court was U...I don't allow a 
plea negotiation to a reckless driving after there has been a 
previous conviction or one previous reckless driving alcohol 
related. That's just, in my mind, upsetting the scheme of things 
as the legislature has proposed it." 
0 
The foregoing provides valid basis for the trial court's 
refusal to approve a plea agreement in this case. Hunsaker has 
failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in 
19 
refusing to approve the plea and the decision of the trial court 
should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the City respectfully requests that 
Hunsaker's appeal be denied, and the conviction of the trial court 
be affirmed. 
DATED this 29th day of November, 1995. 
WEST VALLEY CITY 
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Tom Jones 
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 11. Pleas . 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant 
shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives 
counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to 
plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer 
with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not 
guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill pursu-
ant to Rule 21.5. A defendant may plead in the alternative not 
guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity If a defendant refuses 
to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court 
shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only .with the consent 
of the court. J " * 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case 
shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to make 
bail shall be given a preference for an early trial In cases 
other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for 
a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no 
contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea 
until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or 
she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does 
not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presump-
tion of innocence, the right against compulsory self-
mcrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in 
open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel 
the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering 
the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) the defendant understands the nature and ele-
ments of the offense to which the plea is entered, that 
upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of 
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those 
elements, 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum 
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory 
nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for 
each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences, 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a pnor plea 
discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement 
has been reached, 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time hmits 
for filing any motion to withdraw the plea, and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of 
appeal is limited 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for 
filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or 
guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea 
aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make 
a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any 
other party has agreed to request or recommend the 
acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the 
dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be ap-
proved by the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the 
court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that 
any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the 
court 
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions 
pnor to any plea agreement being made by the prosecut-
ing attorney. 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, 
the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the 
disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for 
it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense 
counsel whether the proposed disposition will be ap-
proved 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition 
should not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the 
judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the 
defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i)'With approval of the court and the consent of the 
prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of 
guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the 
record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of 
the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to with-
draw the plea. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993.) 
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41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, 
or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol con-
centration — Measurement of blood or breath 
alcohol — Criminal punishment — Arrest 
without warrant — Penalt ies — Suspension 
or revocation of l icense — Penalt ies . 
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical 
control of a vehicle within this state if the person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of 
.08 grams or greater as shown by a chemical test 
given within two hours after the alleged operation or 
physical control; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree that renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this 
section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a 
drug is not a defense against any charge of violating this 
section. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon 
grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol 
concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a 
violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon an-
other as a proximate result of having operated 
the vehicle in a negligent manner; or 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in 
the vehicle at the time of the offense. 
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that of 
simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of 
care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person 
exercises under like or similar circumstances. 
(c) In this section, a reference to this section includes 
any similar local ordinance adopted in compliance with 
Section 41-6-43. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, 
upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence 
of not less than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 240 
hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the 
person to work in a community-service work program for 
not less than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours. 
(c) (i) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the 
person to participate in an assessment and educa-
tional series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility, as appropriate. 
(ii) For a violation committed after July 1, 1993, 
the court may order the person to obtain treatment at 
an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility 
if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilita-
tion facility determines that the person has a problem 
condition involving alcohol or drugs. 
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction for a violation committed 
within six years of a prior violation under this section the 
court shall as part of any sentence impose a mandatory 
jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor 
more than 720 hours 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the 
person to work in a community-service work program for 
not less than 80 hours nor more than 240 hours. 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the person to 
participate in an assessment and educational series at a 
licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facil-
ity, as appropriate. The court may, in its discretion, order 
the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed within 
six years of two prior violations under this section is a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in 
Subsections (ii) and (7); and 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convic-
tions are for violations committed after April 23, 
1990. 
(b) (i) Under Subsection (a)(i) the court shall as part of 
any sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of not 
less than 720 nor more than 2,160 hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require 
the person to work in a community-service work 
program for not less than 240 nor more than 720 
hours. 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the 
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate. 
(c) (i) Under Subsection (a)(ii) the court shall as part of 
any sentence impose a fine of not less than $1,000 and 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 
hours nor more than 2,160 hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require 
the person to work in a community-service work 
program for not less than 240 nor more than 720 
hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the 
record the reason it finds the defendant should not 
serve the jail sentence Enrollment in and completion 
of an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation pro-
gram approved by the court may be a sentencing 
alternative to incarceration or community service if 
the program provides intensive care or inpatient 
treatment and long-term closely supervised follow 
through after the treatment 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the 
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility 
(7) (a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a violation 
committed within six years of the prior violations under 
this section is a third degree felony if at least three prior 
convictions are for violations committed after April 23, 
1990. 
(b) The court shall as part of any sentence impose a fine 
of not less than $1,000 and impose a mandatory jail 
sentence of not less than 720 hours nor more than 2,160 
hours. -D 
(c) (i) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require 
the person to work in a community-service work 
program for not less than 240 nor more than 720 
hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the 
record the reason it finds the defendant should not 
serve the jail sentence 
(ii) Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or 
drug dependency rehabilitation program approved by 
the court may be a sentencing alternative to incar-
ceration or community service if the program pro-
vides intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-
term closely supervised follow through after the 
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(d) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the person to 
obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency reha-
bilitation facility. 
(8) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence required 
under this section may not be suspended and the con-
victed person is not eligible for parole or probation until 
any sentence imposed under this section has been served. 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a 
violation under this section may not be terminated. 
(b) The department may not reinstate any license sus-
pended or revoked as a result of the conviction under this 
section, until the convicted person has furnished evidence 
satisfactory to the department that: 
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency assess-
ment, education, treatment, and rehabilitation or-
dered for a violation committed after July 1, 1993, 
have been completed; 
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution 
and rehabilitation costs assessed against the person 
have been paid, if the conviction is a second or 
subsequent conviction for a violation committed 
within six years of a prior violation; and 
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive 
or illegal manner as certified by a licensed alcohol or 
drug dependency rehabilitation facility, if the convic-
tion is for a third or subsequent conviction for a 
violation committed within six years of two prior 
violations committed after July 1, 1993. 
(9) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7) 
that require a sentencing court to order a convicted 
person to: participate in an assessment and educa-
tional series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the 
court, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency 
, rehabilitation facility; obtain, mandatorily, treatment 
at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facil-
ity; or do any combination of those things, apply to a 
conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-45 that 
qualifier as a prior conviction under Subsection (10). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regard-
ing education or treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility, or both, in connec-
tion with a first, second, or subsequent conviction 
under Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior convic-
tion under Subsection (10), as the court would render 
in connection with applying respectively, the first, 
second, or subsequent conviction requirements of 
Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7). 
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction 
under Section 41-6-45 that qualified as a prior conviction 
under Subsection (10), is a first, second, or subsequent 
conviction under this subsection, a previous conviction 
under either this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered 
a prior conviction. 
(c) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation pro-
gram and any community-based or other education pro-
gram provided for in this section shall be approved by the 
Department of Human Services. 
(10) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty 
or no contest to a charge of a violation of Section 
41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under Section 
41-6-43 iri satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an 
original charge of a violation of this section, the 
prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis 
for the plea, including whether or not there had been 
consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant in connection with the viola-
tion. 
Pa 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts 
that shows whether there was consumption of alco-
hol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, 
in connection with the violation. 
(b) (i) The court shall advise the defendant before 
accepting the plea offered under this subsection of the 
consequences of a violation of Section 41-6-45 as 
follows. 
(ii) If the court accepts the defendant's plea of 
guilty or no contest to a charge of violating Section 
,41-6-45, and the prosecutor states for the record that 
there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combi-
nation of Doth, by the defendant in connection with 
the violation, the resulting conviction is a prior con-
viction for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and 
(7). 
(c) The court shall notify the department of each con-
viction of Section 41-6-45 that is a prior offense for the 
purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and (7). 
(11) A peace ofiBcer may, without a warrant, arrest a person 
for a violation of this section when the officer has probable 
cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in his 
presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that 
the violation was committed by the person. 
(12) (a) The Department of* Public Safety shall: 
(i) suspend for 90,days the operator's license of a 
person convicted for the first time under Subsection 
(1); and 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person 
convicted of any subsequent offense under Subsection 
(1) if the violation is committed within a period of six 
years from the date of the prior violation. 
(b) The department shall subtract from any suspension 
or revocation period the number of days for which a 
license was previously suspended under Section 53-3-223, 
if the previous suspension was based on the same occur-
rence upon which the record of conviction is based. 1&94 
